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Abstract 
This paper analyses factors influencing effective service delivery at the grassroots level in Nepal, 
through a qualitative field study which includes in-depth interviews with 110 community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and five focus group discussions. The findings indicate that a wide range of 
governance arrangements have been deployed in the effort to achieve effective service delivery. 
However, many CBOs lack a solid governance system for their development undertakings, leading to 
poor performance and lack of accountability. A number of factors are identified as causing this weak 
practical application of community governance, notably institutional mechanisms, socio-economic 
structures, power politics and interests, capacity limitations and resource constraints. 
Keywords: Community governance, local democracy, community-based organisations, service 
delivery, Nepal 
Introduction  
The third wave of democracy that began in the 1970s produced some defining moments for many 
Probcreate organised electoral arrangements and elected executives to manage state affairs, 
democratisation next sought to create structures for the practice of democracy at all levels. Gradually, 
citizens conscious of community values and aspirations were stimulated to engage in democratic 
activities, and demand both a stake in decision-making and a fair share of resources (Freund and Jaud 
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2013; Whitehead 2002; Khanal 2006). The state and market were no longer seen as the only or best 
agents for dealing with inequality and poverty at the grassroots. As no single actor or institution was 
capable of solving multifarious social and economic problems independently, the idea that germinated 
in development discourse was the need for collaboration, cooperation and social inclusion in any 
development initiatives (Newman 2001). This belief was enshrined in the participatory governance 
paradigm in the 1970s, which advanced the norms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability in 
development and emboldened communities to build partnerships, support the democratic process, and 
establish structures for ‘bottom-up’ policy formulation (Ross and Osborne 1999). This sort of 
‘communitarian movement’ emphasised pluralism in local power distribution arrangements and 
associated nexus between government, civil society and the market (McCluskey et al. 2009).   
Extensive evidence from Asian, African and Latin American countries suggests that community 
institutions are essential for empowering people and helping them exercise their democratic rights. In 
these regions of the global south, community-based institutions strive to educate and empower broader 
segments of the community, introducing democratic principles and strengthening the capabilities of 
poor and vulnerable groups (Johnson 2001).  This work brings many benefits: enforcing social 
accountability, raising public voices against inefficiency and ineffectiveness, generating more inclusive 
decision-making, boosting members’ bargaining power, increasing economic security, building 
partnerships, promoting community empowerment and serving as a channel for organised community 
development (Arrossi et al. 1994). 
In the late 1970s, the concept of ‘new governance’ emerged. This focused on the integration of the 
public and private spheres beyond ‘government’ (O’Toole and Burdess 2004), to achieve ‘governing 
through communities’ – an approach which encouraged government, business groups, community 
institutions and individual citizens to work together and share power, knowledge, skills and resources 
to reach collaborative consensus-based decisions (Stoker 2007; Marsden and Murdoch 1998). The two 
most important goals of this new form of governance were: first, to define ‘community governance’ in 
such a way as to ensure people’s robust participation in multiple roles, linking desired outcomes to 
resources and accountable organisations, and using collaboration as an instrument in development 
(Epstein et al. 2006); and second, to drive institutional effectiveness at the grassroots through 
mechanisms such as neighbourhood management initiatives, partnerships, and community 
empowerment strategies (Connelly 2011). The theory is that these mechanisms help community-based 
organisations (CBOs) in developing a corporate identity and an organisational and managerial ethos 
that support responsibility and accountability in the delivery of services at the grassroots. This in turn 
ensures vigorous community participation in multiple roles, the formation and operation of 
collaborative networks, the tracking of community decision-making, and the contribution of citizens 
towards obtaining desired outcomes (Gaynor 2011).  
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The impetus for this new pattern of ‘grassroots’ governance has been the fragmented nature of the state 
apparatus, flawed market structures and operations, and the urban focus and elite bias of civil society. 
All these impediments must be addressed in order to meet the needs of ordinary people. Nevertheless, 
community-level governance is a daunting challenge.  Existing power-holders, whether members of the 
public, government officials or development partners, have been reluctant to incorporate norms of 
governance in community affairs policies, acts, regulations and guidelines, and this has been a deterrent 
(Bhattachan 2002). In Nepal, patrimonial social structures, a flawed political system, bureaucratic 
disloyalty, a complex administrative apparatus, and exclusionary factors prevent ordinary people from 
gaining equal access to public services.  
It should be acknowledged, however, that some improvements to community governance were noticeable 
after the 1990s, in areas such as service distribution, local resource management, economic/social 
empowerment, social capital building, social/public accountability, anti-discrimination programmes 
and development management. This study looks at the extent to which the situation may have improved 
– or not – in the following 25 years. It attempts to establish specific community governance factors that 
influence effective service delivery at the local level in Nepal, based on recent field study research.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a literature review and some conceptual issues are 
highlighted. Then the methodology of the study is described. The field data is then analysed and findings 
presented in a third section, followed by a discussion of key factors identified (institutional mechanisms, 
socio-economic structures, power politics and interests, and capacity and resources constraints).  
Factors influencing community governance: literature review and conceptual 
perspectives 
In developing societies, communities are predominantly informally organised, relatively lacking in 
technical, human and resource capacity, economically vulnerable and elite-captured (Kamruzzaman 
2018, Ch. 1). Accessing services and resources can be difficult and there exists a high degree of social 
exclusion. Community governance in such societies is influenced by factors such as institutional crisis, 
poor governmental performance, power arrogation and unaccountable leadership, lack of transparency, 
absence of interest representation in decision-making structures, and most notably rampant corruption 
(Ojha et al. 2009). A number of researchers have identified what they see as the key factors. Commins 
(2007) lists factors including social, political and economic exclusion; economic differentiation; 
information asymmetry; and socio-economic disparity. Twenty years before, Escobar (1988) had 
identified a different, but overlapping, list of six factors: changing roles and relationships between 
citizens and the state (central/local government); political, economic and social manipulation of the 
empowerment agenda; difficulties for communities in accessing local services; weak technical and 
financial capacity within community organisations; lack of awareness of those in governance roles; and 
the dominance of traditional power structures. Clarke and Stewart (1998), meanwhile, identified serious 
Acharya & Zafarullah Community governance and service delivery in Nepal 
 
 CJLG December 2018 Page number not for citation purposes         4 
 
structural problems with the concept of ‘new governance’, such as the fragmentation of local 
governments and local service delivery systems, ineffective empowerment mechanisms, problems with 
resource mobilisation, and ineffectual leadership. 
Many authors (including Acharya 2016 and Bowles and Gintis 2002) point out that numerous 
developing countries face an accentuated crisis of governance due to market failures, institutional 
hierarchies, and a democratic deficit. In the 1970s, neo-liberalism (privatisation, denationalisation and 
deregulation) sought to improve community governance and service delivery in developing countries. 
However, many of the strategies adopted were too narrowly focused, while others were too general to 
be linked to community concerns with governance. Some authors consider only institutional factors to 
be relevant, such as the enabling environment (legal provisions, decentralised policies and strategies, 
good governance), organisational commitment (devolution, partnership development, coordinated 
working), conflicts of interests between partners, and policy bias (Ostrom et al. 1993; Zafarullah and 
Huque 2001); but others identify wider social factors such as exclusion, feudal legacy, exploitation, 
social discrimination, modernisation, globalisation, westernisation, and marketisation or competition 
(Illing and Gibson 2007; Roodt 1996). Many also emphasise political factors, such as power structures, 
political and social elitism, patron–client relationships, political processes, and neo-colonial policies 
(Lewis and Kanji 2009; Malla 2001). Yet other explanations include factors related to poverty and 
deprivation, vulnerability, seasonality, and powerlessness and humiliation (Chambers 1995; Hulme and 
Shepherd 2003); or to lack of skills and knowledge to capitalise on local resources (Oliver 1997); or to 
unequal resource distribution (Marwell and Ames 1979); and financial crises (Mahanty et al. 2009). 
More recently, community governance has been influenced by technological innovation and 
developments in information and communication technology (Acharya 2016; Waema and Adera 2011).  
It is clear that a multitude of factors influence the efficiency of organisational activities.  However, one 
underlying constant is that trust between all actors is essential to achieve community uplift (Dewett and 
Jones 2001). This is too often absent.  Banner (2002) describes the disenchantment of many grassroots 
actors who view community governance as upwardly, rather than downwardly, accountable and thus 
susceptible to uncertainties. In such conditions, ordinary people are very vulnerable as they are forced 
to rely on external actors, who are by nature more bureaucratic and typically prefer a hierarchical 
structure that may threaten the community governance system. On the other hand, if used sensitively, 
central and local government commitment, engagement of the private sector, and community cooperation 
can help achieve effectiveness (Cheshire 2000). Weber et al. (2001) suggest that major shifts in 
community governance are outcomes of a combination of three elements – policy discourse, policy 
actors, and policy instruments – all of which are influenced by events and institutional performance.    
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Some authors suggest that information and technological development have often skewed priorities and 
agendas away from community-centred issues and towards national, regional and global imperatives 
(Pillora and McKinlay 2011). In such cases, community governance will hardly be able to compete with 
the public sector and market forces. Additionally, issues such as stakeholder competition, 
empowerment, citizen engagement, civic leadership, ownership, public responsibility and legitimisation, 
community control of and access to resources, and state funding mechanisms, will deeply affect whether 
community governance is effective or not (Gaventa 2004). Such factors often create hierarchical 
structures and empower nominated leaders rather than ordinary citizens (Banner 2002). In such conditions, 
community governance may not be seen as legitimate, and may be unable to make institutional shifts 
(single to multiple) or system transformation (top-down versus bottom-up) (Stâhlberg 1997).   
Still more issues affect community governance: institutional vacuums, patrimonial power structures, 
political and social patronage, fragmented political cultures, disenchanted bureaucracies, lack of 
information, poor economic performance, political and bureaucratic capture of power and resources, 
centralised delivery systems, lack of transparency, lack of autonomy, insensitive development that 
weakens community cohesion, structural social exclusion, lack of organisational resources and 
knowledge, and limited physical and human capacities (Dahal 2010; Ross and Osborne 1999; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2005; Grindle 2007). On a more positive note, O’Toole (2006) argues that community 
governance is the form of governance closest to the people: it enables and empowers them to participate 
directly in decision-making, facilitates quick responses to people’s needs and priorities, and promotes 
genuine ownership by local people.  
It seems clear, therefore, that the effectiveness of community governance depends on the efficient 
functioning of a wide range of variables such as inclusive participation, the empowerment agenda, 
transparency and accountability, an enabling environment, local democratic practice, service delivery 
and integrity mechanisms, social capital, institution-building, community mobilisation, planning, 
implementing and monitoring, institutional arrangements (both formal and informal) and coordination, 
linkages and partnerships between development agencies (Nsubuga and Olum 2009). These formal 
variables of community governance have to be seen from trust-based relationships and reciprocity, and 
volunteerism perspectives, as well. These variables enhance or limit the effectiveness of organisations’ 
decisions or actions. At the community level, their degree of impact may be determined by the actions’ 
relevance, accuracy, credibility, quality and integrity, timeliness and punctuality, coherence, 
accessibility and cost-efficiency.  
In Nepal, the concept of community governance is associated with the notion of dharma (religion), 
which determines institutional duties, power practices and the governing system (Dahal 2004). These 
traditional governing practices have contributed to preserving social harmony by shaping social 
dynamics, social power relations and grassroots self-governance systems (Wong and Shik 2011). 
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However, self-governance in the past was not encouraged (Bhattachan 2002). The reluctance of the 
public, inter-governmental, non-governmental and donor sectors to incorporate community governance 
into their policies, statutes, regulations and guidelines weakened such ‘people-led’ governance (Dahal 
2004). Subsequently, conventional institutional arrangements, centralised decision-making, lack of 
coordination and collaboration among development actors, misappropriation of resources, and capture 
of opportunities by dominant groups at the local level created institutional disaster (Khanal 2006). It is 
these kinds of practices that are the major causes of failures of community governance and declines in 
service effectiveness.   
Key factors influencing community governance in Nepal 
We will now look briefly at the literature on four key factors influencing community governance in 
Nepal: institutional mechanisms, socio-economic structures, power politics and interests, and capacity 
limitations and resource constraints. 
Institutional mechanisms: In 1977, a concerted initiative towards decentralisation in Nepal was 
initiated with the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), which focused 
on the concept of partnerships between central government and community groups in delivering local-
level services (Rondinelli 1983). Communities were directed to build new informal institutions as 
service facilitators. However, this initiative not only neglected the indigenous community-based 
systems but also permitted rural power elites to avoid engaging in community participation. They 
captured all possible alternatives, dominated the service system, and destroyed public motivation for 
institutional development. Subsequent research has found that the arrangements for delivering 
agricultural extension, education and health services at that time were determined by political elites, 
without reference to the needs of local people or statutory requirements.  Edmunds and Wollenberg 
(2001) reported that local elites are socially embedded in Nepal and have substantial influence over 
local institutions and communities – both in project selection and implementation and in harnessing 
resources. This study found that most of the resourceful CBOs, and a number of other groups, had been 
captured by these elites. In these groups, there is no scope for different voices, downward accountability 
is missing, and the pro-poor approach has been largely rejected. Gauli and Hauser (2009) cite, for 
example, how Nepal’s Community Forestry Programme has been widely criticised for being dominated 
by elites and for providing much larger benefits to the better-off than to the poor.   
Institutional failure within community groups can be caused by many factors: lack of an appropriate 
and legitimised institutional structure; reduced efficiency; absence of vision, mission and guiding 
principles; lack of an enabling environment; centralised decision-making systems; and reluctance to 
strengthen community institutions (Lee and McBride 2007). At best, these gaps reinforce upward 
accountability and weaken governance; at worst, such exploitation has led to the demise of many CBOs 
and paralysed others.  In the study areas, close relations between service providers (state and non-state) 
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and local elites led to the capture of services by the latter, and made access for ordinary people difficult. 
Nor was service delivery the only issue; the formation and maintenance of voluntary community 
organisations became harder, and the quality of service was badly compromised.  
After 1990, the newly-formed democratic government reformed many policies within the framework 
of neo-liberalism – through decentralisation, denationalisation or privatisation, and deregulation. Local 
governments were designated as ‘development coordinators’ at the intermediate and grassroots levels. 
However, governance was poor as job descriptions for key personnel were unstructured and undefined, 
and policy guidelines for local government operations were weak. Such guidelines were not only 
politically biased, but also led to local governments becoming regulated institutions of central 
government (Dahal 2010). Lack of capacity of local leaders, coupled with the capture of institutional 
power by vested interests, made the bureaucratised local bodies sluggish and inefficient and inhibited 
downward accountability. These entities began controlling and regulating people’s institutions – the 
CBOs – rather than facilitating and coordinating them. Similarly, due to pressure from political leaders 
and local elites, only a small number of CBOs were accepted as local government partners. Nor – if the 
findings of this study are a guide – did these handpicked CBOs always work to meet people’s expectations.  
Socio-economic structures: Since restoration of democracy in 1990, the Nepalese government has 
focused on social mobilisation programmes to create awareness, enhance community capacity and 
increase community participation in decision-making.  The aim of these efforts is to create a sustainable 
framework at community level within which to tackle poverty. Factors such as social attitudes, the 
feudal legacy, ethnicity, family status, economic standing, awareness levels, locality, and community 
values play a key role in determining whether community governance will be effective. In the 
geographical area studied by this research project, the community social structure has three main 
dimensions. First, there is the Hindu caste system which governs people’s attitudes, culture and social 
stratification. Secondly, societies are ruled by a patrimonial system, which is an offshoot of legacy, 
culture and traditional practices. Thirdly, social position is determined by economic status, which 
creates a materialistic basis for socio-economic life. These three factors all contribute to stratifying 
communities and draining people’s confidence, as well as affecting relationships and obstructing the 
introduction of new social practices. It may be argued that the transformational processes such as 
community-owned ideas, economic betterment enterprises, capacity empowerment, and teaching skills 
and knowledge for social change, have systematically collapsed and further destabilised marginalised 
communities (Uphoff 1993). Many studies indicate that marginalised communities are typically highly 
illiterate, unaware of their rights and responsibilities, excluded from political, social and economic 
opportunities, and oppressed by various kinds of discrimination (Bennett 2005; Bernt and Colini 2013; 
Dean and Platt 2016; Silver 2007; de Haan 2011). 
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Power politics and interests: In almost all CBOs, executive leaders or influential general members are 
either politically connected, or their actions are intricately associated with individual political interests 
or hidden political agendas (Acharya 2016; Yates 2012; Bhattacharya and Basnyat 2005). These leaders 
become, therefore, not agents of social change but rather politically motivated actors who adopt 
strategies of patronage, exclusion and championing pet projects.  Consequently, many CBOs do not 
share any common interest with the people: they adopt neither a common vision nor an inclusive agenda, 
and they pay little or no attention to policies, guidelines and legalities. Hierarchical attitudes to power 
work against empowerment agendas, and also erode social cohesiveness. Upreti and Müller-Böker 
(2010) link these practices to Nepal’s feudal legacy, suggesting that this legacy has undermined the 
interests of weaker segments of society in local democracy, governance and programme 
implementation. 
Capacity limitations and resource constraints: In the past, the government in its eighth Five Year 
Plan (1992–1997) had officially adopted a ‘participatory’ approach and sought people’s participation 
in service delivery (Pandit et al. 2007). Still in force, this approach places CBOs centre stage as the 
‘best’ instrument for delivery of services at the community level. However, many CBOs, particularly 
in remote areas, are inefficient due to a lack of skills, and to exclusion (Uphoff 2004). Malla (2001) 
argues that a paternalistic attitude has on the one hand created a patronising relationship in decision-
making, and on the other has led to manipulation of information and communication techniques, which 
rob disadvantaged people of their access to opportunities and services. If CBOs can achieve a social 
‘licence to operate’, it is much easier for them to become established and hence to receive resources 
and partner with development agencies. This type of legitimisation also fosters social accountability, 
institutional capability and access to resources (Opare 2007). Nonetheless, although this approach 
promotes a degree of self-reliance within local communities and their institutions, the imperfect market 
network, elite and middle-men influences, and technical and financial constraints still remain obstacles. 
Methodology 
This research purposively chose as its study focus the village development committees – ie the lowest 
unit of local government – in the villages of Pawannagar, Shantinagar, Shreegaun, Hekuli and Goltakuri 
in Dang district, Nepal. All five are remote settlements known for endemic poverty and enduring 
marginalisation from service delivery structures. Our fieldwork identified that over 60% of the 
population in the five villages live in households classified as ultra-poor or poor. Only 33.5% of 
households can access safe drinking water, and only 43.6% can access sanitation. Within the villages, 
59.4% of residents are literate. The involvement of local government bodies, sectoral line agencies, 
donors and NGOs in these localities has a long history.   
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Three broad categories of CBOs were chosen for analysis. These included community forestry user 
groups (CFUGs), community development organisation groups (CDOGs) and women’s development 
groups (WDGs). The CFUGs were directly involved in natural resource management activities as per 
government regulations. CDOGs, supported by local government and development partners, conducted 
social, economic and infrastructural development activities, while WDGs attempted to ensure women’s 
participation and gender inclusion in local development activities at the grassroots level. As people’s 
representatives and facilitators of local services, these bodies have been actively involved at the 
community level since 1990, when enabling legislation was passed. In the selection of respondents, a 
sampling method was used. The randomly selected sample size of 110 from a total CBO population of 
152 was determined using the Yamane (1967) method1 to ensure sample representation at a 0.05 margin 
of error.  
A qualitative method involving in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) was adopted 
to generate the primary data. Interviews were held with 110 groups out of 152 groups during the period 
of scheduled group meetings. The respondents were two people from each of the 110 CBO groups, 
namely the chairperson and the secretary. These interviews were designed to gather the opinions and 
attitudes of participants on the relationship between the community, the CBO, and state and non-state 
partners in community governance and service delivery. Semi-structured questionnaires were used for 
the interviews, with questions addressing the main research issues: participation, community 
empowerment and mobilisation, local democracy, social capital and governance.  
Likewise, five FGD sessions were organised with the remaining 42 groups. The participants included 
chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers (for the important function they are entrusted with) from each 
group, and discussion focused on management, public access to services and the peacebuilding process 
in the aftermath of the communist uprising and takeover. Each FGD lasted approximately 90 minutes. 
Proceedings were recorded electronically and later transcribed. From the FGDs, governance patterns 
and the nature of public access to services were discerned. Research ethics standards, as set out in the 
Guidelines for Human Research 2  at the University of New England, Australia, were applied in 




                                                 
1Yamane sampling method      n =        N               hence      n =  152            Therefore the sample size = 110 
                                           1 + N (e)2         1 + 152 (0.05)2     
 
2  Human Research Ethics, University of New England www.une.edu.au/research/ethics-and-grants/human-
research-ethics 
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Findings: the extent to which key enabling factors for community governance 
were present in the five villages 
Six factors extrapolated from the conceptual discussion above that enable sound community governance 
are discussed below. These are: inclusive participation, community empowerment, community 
mobilisation, strengthening local democracy, social capital development, and transparency and 
accountability. We discus each in turn, and then move the broader cross-cutting discussion.  
Inclusive participation  
Participating in this research project gave people real opportunities to express what makes a difference 
in the issues affecting them, and what influences community decisions and actions. Analysis of 
participants’ responses showed that meaningful community participation was thought to be achieved 
through the sharing of power and resources, deliberate efforts by social groups to control their own 
destinies, and the opening up of opportunities at the grassroots. This was believed to have led to the 
development of broader networks of communities working together on ‘governing’ activities, and also 
to improvements in efficiency and accountability. In community service delivery, it was viewed to be 
very beneficial to have equal participation from women and disadvantaged communities in all types of 
decision-making: planning and selecting projects, allocating resources, and sharing out benefits. The 
shared benefits that respondents described were of several kinds: economic (forest resources, 
savings/credit schemes, government/non-government grants); social (equal distribution of 
opportunities, power and authority); democratic (access to the leadership selection process); and 
informational inclusivity in generating knowledge resources, influence in decision-making, training, 
interaction, and capacity-building).  
In addition, it was reported that inclusion increased if members from lower caste groups, women and 
ethnic minorities were placed in executive positions to influence decision-making relevant to group 
activities.  These practices demonstrate that meaningful participation was achieved by mobilising local 
people’s economic resources (for example via a compulsory savings policy, or the formation of a 
resource mobilisation group), the harnessing of natural resources (forest management, sustainable use 
of forest resources, small-scale water mills, irrigation canals), and consensus-based management 
through local awareness-raising and information-sharing. It was found that the following three 
conditions contributed to making a real difference in inclusive participation: transparent democratic 
practices with clear accountability; appropriate facilitation to support groups and members; and positive 
action by rural elites, who were normally in leadership positions.  
By contrast, the following conditions were observed to have some negative effect: unresponsive key 
actors, a ‘non-listening’ culture, weak community relationships, wayward leadership by elites, strong 
political influence, lack of devolved power, and lack of appreciation of local communities.  
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The following opinion of a participant encapsulates this finding:  
Not only government policies, rules, and regulations, but also the internal mechanisms of 
CBOs and their service systems are not all effective. The selection of leadership, and other 
decision-making processes such as the formulation of plans and projects and mobilisation 
of resources are power-structured, which does not encourage people’s participation and 
their access to the service system. 
The research found that many of the CBOs were incapable of configuring structures, organising 
leadership, and designing linkages and guidelines that promote the required meaningful participation. 
A number of reasons for this were identified: poorly organised group meetings without prior or adequate 
notice, a lack of agenda and structured discussion, absence of ground rules or regulations, and general 
organisation members’ ignorance of their roles and responsibilities. These created three types of issues 
in decision-making. The first was low attendance at meetings, especially among weaker and more 
vulnerable segments of the population, which in turn created an environment of domination by the rural 
elites. Secondly, there were no guarantees that the elite group would listen to the voices of poorer 
community members. The third issue was manipulation of records (falsification, inaccuracy or 
exaggeration). These issues led to CBOs becoming ineffective in delivering services. 
Community empowerment 
Community empowerment concerns how members of a group are able to act collectively in ways that 
enhance their influence on, or control over, decisions that affect their interests. It is a multi-dimensional 
concept, in which actions reflect local values and belief systems, and help people or groups to gain 
power and control over their own lives. This study found that CBOs were quite successful in being 
heard and creating an enabling environment for people’s participation in the decision-making process. 
There were a number of specific contributing factors. First, where local government bodies deliberately 
allied themselves with communities, and provided institutional facilitation, this contributed to 
empowering the communities. In such situations, local communities typically received regular annual 
funding from the local government for social empowerment issues. Second, strategic alliances between 
the local government bodies, NGOs and communities were found to enhance local capacity. For 
example, NGOs and donors used technical support packages to foster social mobilisation, awareness-
raising, advocacy, lobbying, planning and monitoring activities, and skill-based income-generating 
activities. Third, communities under CBO leadership appreciated the CBO’s role in making community 
initiatives happen; CBOs were seen as exerting pressure on development agencies for downward 
accountability, and as being a major stakeholder in their communities. Respondents cited many instances 
which demonstrated how CBOs helped communities to set up and embed participatory planning and 
budgeting, tracking of public expenditure, citizen monitoring of projects, and citizens’ charters. These 
initiatives decreased political influence in decision-making through people’s inputs and increased service 
co-production and management, as well as improving service delivery. Equally, if CBOs were able to 
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boost economic empowerment this ensured community access to economic benefits including jobs, 
financial services, property and other productive assets, skills development and market information.  
Most of the CBO groups studied were found to be relatively well organised. They had an annual 
programme of work, horizontal and vertical linkages and networking systems, an institutional vision 
and guidelines (including for monitoring and supervision), and a citizens’ charter. They also publicised 
their programmes, resources, and decisions, held regular group meetings, ensured effective resource 
allocation and project implementation, and regularly audited and evaluated their activities. Finally, 
many communities were skilled at settling conflicts and disputes over resource allocation and 
mobilisation, and had developed negotiation and mediating skills; these skills enhanced citizens’ power 
with political parties and local government. Nevertheless, CBOs were hampered by official systems 
which did not support them.  Legal acts, regulations, policies and the ways these were enforced or 
implemented were not always inclusive in practice.  These often failed to fully transfer power to the 
local level and also entrenched the centre’s political interests in the name of decentralisation. 
Respondents stated that the complexities of these legal procedures actually strengthened the 
centralisation process and increased the influence of political and local elites within communities, rather 
than promoting community autonomy.  
These realities led to three types of crisis of governance at the community level. First, many CBOs 
chose not to adopt governance indicators in their development initiatives as these would be nullified by 
influential political actors. Secondly, some CBOs became bogged down in delivering services.  Thirdly, 
such problems created major obstacles to the CBOs carrying out their work. As one participant put it: 
Our past was very difficult; we did not have education, health, communication, and 
transportation facilities. Our generation has been living without hopes and aspiration of 
better livelihood. The lack of effective policies and their poor implementation by the 
government and their extended arms (state and non-state partners) are the causes of our 
insecure life. 
Historically, CBOs have not been always in a position to influence decision-making, and their 
contribution has rarely been formally acknowledged. For this and other reasons, local communities and 
their institutions were frequently powerless. This led many research participants to confirm that the 
present system provided benefits only to the rich and to elites, political leaders and service agencies; 
putting them in a controlling position and marginalising the community and its institutions.  
Community mobilisation 
This study found that CBOs did enable communities in the study area to serve as liaison agencies 
between their neighbourhoods and their local public institutions. They also encouraged ‘watchdog’ or 
accountability activities, such as public hearings. Examples of CBO community activities included: 
effective management of local forests, rural-based micro-finance, increased enrolment of primary- and 
secondary-level students, improved public access to primary healthcare, and improvements in the 
supply of agricultural and drinking water. 
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A wide range of other empowering activities were cited. These related to service planning and delivery 
(prioritisation, monitoring and oversight); coordination and networking with service providers; 
combating harmful traditional beliefs  (campaigns against the dowry system, untouchability, illiteracy, 
witchery, child marriage, domestic violence, and caste-and gender-based discrimination); increasing 
representation and participation among women and marginal community groups; boosting  local 
democracy, for example by increasing the ‘voice’ of diverse groups; and involvement in choosing the 
leaders and management committees for local schools.  Some of the inclusive activities specifically 
encouraged women, tharus minority ethnic groups, the marginalised dalits and other marginalised 
people to participate in group activities.  
These achievements indicate that CBOs make a substantial contribution to community mobilisation. 
They have been playing a decisive role in enhancing sustainability, improving efficiency and 
effectiveness, empowering poor people, and strengthening inclusive governance. Their assistance in 
mobilising economic resources such as savings, government and non-government funding and 
community-owned assets (forests, land, quarry stone, sand and water) has not only enabled effective 
service delivery but also contributed to these services’ long-term sustainability. For example, over time 
rural communities with CBOs have been able to collect a significant amount of money to invest in rural 
cooperatives that provide soft loans to other villagers. These processes not only promote indigenous 
skills, but also help communities reduce their dependency on external agencies.  
However, many obstacles to robust community empowerment remain. Barriers identified by 
respondents included: poor awareness of governance systems and absence of best practice, poor social 
accountability, poorly managed public hearings, flawed social audits and citizen report cards, and elite-
based power structures within the community. Further empirical findings from the study were apathy 
on the part of local people; frustration and dissatisfaction within communities; structural problems for 
CBOs, such as upward accountability; and dependence on government and donor agencies – which 
could be in conflict with community-owned indigenous practices, cooperation, collaboration and 
communitarian values. Some respondents felt that CBOs were themselves highly power-structured: 
more concerned with accessing resources and demonstrating upward accountability to their funding 
agencies than with ensuring inclusive leadership. For this reason, it was felt that they are, in general, 
highly influenced by political agendas and less focused on volunteerism and social movements against 
injustice. On the other hand, some respondents did feel CBOs were conscious of people’s aspirations 
and, by their nature, less political. However, this politically-neutral stance was seen as leading to a lack 
of resources, meaning not only that CBOs were unable to meet public needs and demands, but also 
faced declining membership and increasing dysfunctionality. One participant’s view is pertinent: 
We intend to utilise the CFUG’s resources for community development, so that we can 
meet our basic needs and demands. [But] whenever a meeting is conducted, the chair and 
secretary show the demand lists such as granting resources for the salary of school 
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teachers, funding support to the local political parties, and presenting forest products to 
the district-level bureaucrats. If we opposed their agendas, they would create 
administrative and legal complexities and put us in a trap.  
This shows people may be denied service opportunities, unless they go along with CBO activities which 
may not have been democratically decided. Such a forced approach inevitably provides only short-term 
results, leaving implemented projects/programmes either unsustainable or lacking public ownership. 
Similarly, there was a lack of joined-up thinking between different types of empowerment activities 
(economic, social and political). This type of flawed intervention favoured upward accountability and 
a supply-driven service system, increased outsiders’ influence, minimised the role of local people, and 
misused resources. 
Strengthening local democracy 
Democracy is a value-laden concept, but is generally agreed to concern the rights of people to participate 
in decision-making processes. If fully implemented, it is a system where participation and 
representation of all sections of the population at all levels of decision-making is guaranteed. It 
promotes local diversity, creates a level playing field for political parties, and weakens vested interests. 
At the community level, democracy can contribute to developing community dialogue, maintaining a 
community calendar, communicating about policies and programmes, providing practical information 
on service delivery, capturing feedback and citizen input, organising local and neighbourhood 
associations, and organising campaigns and citizen initiatives.   
This study found a clear value for local democracy at the community level. First, it was seen to weaken 
hierarchical power structures. Second, it supported the establishment of a power structure that put the 
community at the centre.  Third, it helped increase the effectiveness of governance and hence accessible, 
equitable, and quality-driven services, as well as accountability, political skills and service integrity. 
Positive outcomes of this kind not only inspired community members to organise themselves, but also 
encouraged them to raise awareness in the community on issues such as social justice, civil rights, equal 
opportunity, fairness, and participation in educational, economic and institutional activities. However, 
the study found great variation in the degree to which local democracy was adopted by CBOs. Some 
appeared to practise democracy only if convenient to them. The main reasons for this were felt to be 
the feudal legacy in the CBO system, low levels of user awareness and access to democratic 
opportunities, bureaucratic and political reluctance to devolve power and authority, complex legal 
practices and policies, and political bias. Communities felt that CBOs were highly politicised, elite-
captured and, to some extent, derived their legitimacy from delegated authority rather than from their 
actual communities. In these groups, manipulation and influence were common phenomena that harmed 
communities economically and socially.  
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The following observation is typical, showing how local people may be oppressed by the misuse of a 
majority-based democratic system:  
As original dwellers, we constituted the CFUG, formulated guidelines, demarcated fire 
lines, replanted and rehabilitated the barren land. However, we have become a minority 
now. After the migration from hill districts during the period of conflict, migrant numbers 
are higher than us. Now, they hold key positions on committees due to the majority-based 
democratic system and have formulated policies, rules and regulations according to their 
advantage. This has violated the CFUG’s norms and rules.  
Some of the reasons given as to why CBOs did not promote wider access were low educational status 
and awareness, patriarchal social structures, and family pressure. Many CBO members claimed they were 
denied access to leaders and opportunities to put their arguments. If they disagreed with the leadership, 
they would be discriminated against when it came to resource utilisation and allocation. This study also 
found evidence that most CBOs were being used as political vehicles for boosting leadership status, and 
as bargaining instruments. Generally, leaders reserved many opportunities for their own followers.  
Social capital development  
Social capital is a valuable output of trust and relationships. At the community level, social capital may 
be defined as association, trust and reciprocity between individuals and within communities that boosts 
community confidence, heightens community participation, enhances well-being, reduces malpractice, 
and promotes economic prosperity.  Uphoff (1993, p. 619) states that “CBOs are closer to the people, 
drive people’s knowledge, assess the local situation, and create an environment to mould responsible 
people to work for their communities”. This study’s findings support this view, showing social capital 
resulting in positive relations within communities and functioning groups, and encouraging network-
building within the community that counters elite capture and breaks down rigid power structures. In 
this sense, greater transparency, more accountability and equal opportunities for participation in CBO 
activities create an environment of trust at the community level. This inspires people to provide 
voluntary services (physical or cash contributions) for community activities. For example, we find that 
that increasing public access to primary health services, improving school enrolment, and facilitating 
communication between people and their local government and sectoral agencies, generates strong 
cooperation between communities and CBOs.  
More specifically, successful CBOs aimed at promoting strong capacity, a positive working culture and 
clear rules and regulations (bidhan and karya nirdesika), which fostered inclusive participation and 
responsible use and management of local resources. For example, the implementation of a pro-poor 
policy in service provision encouraged deprived dalit and tharu people to participate. Resourceful 
CBOs supported marginal communities to become involved in infrastructure development projects that 
affected them, such as drinking water schemes and culvert and road construction. They also provided 
scholarships to schoolchildren from marginal communities and encouraged people to organise 
themselves into groups. The formation of paralegal committees enabled many women’s issues to be 
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settled at the village level. They also encouraged equal sharing of benefits, democratic decision-making 
and leader selection, and transparency. CBOs which acted this way, and honestly addressed issues, 
attracted strong social support. Thus it can be seen that creating social capital required investment and 
use of embedded resources in social relations.  
A significant problem found by the present survey was that some groups are not formally constituted in 
law. As a result, government and non-government partners refuse to build formal partnerships with 
them. The evidence suggests that these CBOs had weak links with external organisations and were 
influenced by the traditional cultural practices of their communities and the patronage-based practices 
of the government. This culture led agencies to play the role of giver, and the people that of receiver.  
On this issue, a participant expressed his dissatisfaction thus: 
In our experience, the present legitimisation process is nothing more than politics of 
decentralisation. This has influenced the local community to split and collapse social 
harmony in the community. Some groups (CFUGs legitimised by the prevailing law) have 
been enjoying local forest resources and others such as CDOGs, WDGs, and farmer and 
livestock groups, are lagging behind. This has created inter-group conflict in the community. 
Overall, many CBO groups found it hard to build social capital. Poorly planned services, lack of 
information on how benefits are shared out, non-users’ participation in project user committees, and a 
general lack of transparency have led to public dissatisfaction with CBO activities. This has directly 
affected their ability to create social capital. 
Transparency and accountability  
Transparency may be defined as openness and an ongoing communication process to achieve public 
accountability in a timely and reliable way. This study found that transparency at the local level could 
be enhanced through the use of scorecards for public services and by supporting local independent 
media (radio, local newspapers), social audits and public hearings. These measures promoted steady 
improvements in accountability, both in the short and the long term. Within the study area, some CBO 
groups had established a social intelligence system for improving transparency and accountability, by 
monitoring community actions. Its work included accurate identification of the status and progress of 
activities, as well as any omissions and delays. Support for this system was growing, due to its interactive 
nature. Many people in the community put their trust in such organised community-based ‘watchdog’ 
groups because they felt they was more reliable and trustworthy, and were community-owned.  
This respondent reported that community engagement had brought many improvements in the 
governance process, notably by monitoring group integrity, which reduced corruption and increased 
service effectiveness. The role of ‘nagarik sarokar samiti’ (citizen concerned groups) was seen as 
successful in improving community-managed schools, drinking water schemes, and watershed 
conservation practices. Frequent monitoring, feedback, and solution-seeking enhanced CBO 
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performance making services more effective. Nevertheless, many CBOs were not sharing information 
or communicating with their members. The practice of regular assemblies was poorly implemented.  
Equally, there was a huge reluctance among CBOs to implement public and social audit programmes 
for their activities. All these findings indicate poor community governance. The following observation 
of a participant is pertinent: 
Almost all CBOs’ leadership is highly influenced by nepotism, cronyism and favouritism. 
Their activities, resources, and benefits are mostly linked with the government, NGOs and 
donor agencies. In many activities, such as project selection, funding, and implementation, 
the community people are provided with no information. But when they need to show public 
involvement, they demand our participation. Because of the lack of downward 
accountability, we aren’t ready to contribute. 
This finding suggests that CBO power tends to be concentrated in a few individuals, leading to weak 
community governance. People’s main concerns were about participating in local-level decision-
making, so they could formulate priority projects in areas such as roads, education, health services and 
access to drinking water and sanitation, agricultural extension, vocational skills training, and 
employment opportunities. However, their capacity to do so was limited by their lack of education, 
poverty, low political and social standing, geographical isolation and poor information.  
Discussion: key factors influencing community governance and service delivery  
The findings outlined above indicate that service delivery and governance at the community level in 
Nepal is fairly weak and many CBOs are unaccountable and not always responsive to community needs. 
The problem is not so much a lack of political and bureaucratic initiatives; but rather the influence of 
excessive regulation, a lack of professionalism, the ineffective application of the rule of law, corruption, 
and the dominance of rural elites. These issues have deterred communities from actively engaging in 
governance matters, and despite considerable – albeit sporadic – efforts, many CBOs remain non-
compliant with many of the norms and essentials of community governance.  
We now discuss these issues with a focus on four themes: institutional mechanisms, socio-economic 
structures, power politics and interests, and capacity and resource constraints. 
Institutional mechanisms  
Many respondents expressed the view that service delivery had become politicised after democratisation, 
and CBO groups had become political vehicles. The accountability of some CBOs is inclined towards 
the elites, political leaders, bureaucrats and resourceful NGOs – making them not only citizen-
unfriendly, lethargic and unaccountable to their communities, but also unethical, inefficient, and 
manipulative of resources and services. There appears to be an institutional crisis at community level. 
Contact between community actors has been very limited. Some groups are affiliated to a particular 
development agency, which may be regarded as highly valuable by the leadership, but ordinary 
members of the group are denied opportunities.  The actions of such ‘special’ agencies have dissuaded 
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communities from expanding their relationships with others for support. Indeed, competition and 
conflict between development agencies has implications for coordination and linkages at the grassroots. 
Likewise, there appear to be conflicts of interest between ordinary members and the leadership of CBOs 
which impair institutional efficiency at the community level. According to this study’s findings, the 
conflicts arise over resource mobilisation and management, skills and knowledge development, 
leadership contests, and project selection and implementation. Many distortions and institutional 
deficiencies have emerged at the community level which, counter-productively, have actually increased 
the long-term dependency of communities on external agencies, and have threatened the sustainability 
of service delivery. 
Socio-economic structures 
Within this study, some participants complained that existing social and economic practices offered 
disproportionate opportunities to the rich and better-off sections of the population. The research found 
three distinct drivers of poor community governance in Nepal: patron–client relationships, structural 
legacies, and social and economic exclusion. CBOs’ activities are decided by a social elite, the local 
power structure, resource politics and donors’ wishes. These have not only created ambiguities but have 
also encouraged the elites to adversely affect service delivery managed by CBOs. Participants pointed 
out that group leadership is always in the hands of local elites, such as zamindars (landlords), who are 
oblivious to people’s problems, careless about informing them of decisions they make, and 
discriminatory in distributing benefits.  
Although the Nepalese Constitution mandates democracy for all citizens, in practice this right has 
remained largely confined to males and the so-called ‘higher’ castes in society. Many participants in 
the present study stated that democratic practice at the community level was not inclusive, citing several 
reasons. Firstly, some respondents felt local people themselves were not ready to participate, due to a 
lack of awareness or inadequate orientation. A second reason given was that political parties and 
development partners conspired to unfairly devalue less powerful groups within the community, 
especially women. Thirdly, it was noted that the way policy is formulated and reformulated in 
discussion with central authorities is very technocratic, mechanistic and over-formalised.  
Fourthly, some respondents felt CBO groups lacked the necessary capabilities. If reforms were 
introduced, they invariably functioned in a ‘trickle-down’ manner, leading to a situation which created 
winners and losers at the community level.  Women participants argued, for example, that there was 
hardly any space to discuss or prioritise social and financial activities, and also that discriminatory 
practices blocked their daughters from attending boarding schools. These grievances have fractured 
social cohesion. On a similar note, many participants declared that only people who already have voice, 
power and wealth can articulate the issues and convince development partners to serve their interests. 
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This consequently excludes many communities, organisations and individuals from the community-
building system and overall governance process. 
Power politics and interests  
Participants did not have unreasonable expectations: they expressed modest hopes and simple dreams 
for a comfortable life. However, one-size-fits-all NGO and donor rules and ‘top-down’ governmental 
regulations have created undue hurdles for communities seeking to move from a community-owned 
indigenous system to a framework that supports modernisation and a market economy. This study’s 
findings suggest, for example, that many preconditions set by development agencies are pointless and 
have resulted in the formation of parallel institutions that squeeze out community institutions in 
planning and implementation. This situation has hindered community members in organising 
themselves and actively identifying problems, planning and making decisions, and taking action to meet 
their objectives – with or without government or NGO support. Some participants, however, believed 
that service delivery is primarily the responsibility of the government, which should deliver services to 
the communities. Government organisations, however, maintain that some powers, functions and 
resources have been devolved to CBOs, but because the latter are not sufficiently motivated or 
interested, they do not carry out their roles effectively. To this, CBOs reply that whatever power has 
been devolved has been captured by local elites. For example, the low level of cooperation between 
CBOs and development agencies has been a key deterrent to establishing strategic alliances for 
undertaking service delivery.  
In Nepal, there has been a serious absence of robust localised political authority in local government 
for several decades. This vacuum has led to a misuse and misallocation of development resources that 
has adversely affected community governance, democratic practice and leadership capability at the 
grassroots. To fill decision-making and implementation gaps at local level, CBOs are in theory regarded 
as the best institutional instrument. Yet, capacity and resource constraints, along with conflict between 
sectoral interests, have impaired their operational efficiency. As a stop-gap arrangement, the central 
government established an ‘all-party’ political mechanism to fill the vacuum and carry on service 
delivery and development projects in local authority areas but corruption and cronyism have not 
diminished. However, this mechanism serves a limited purpose as it remains unaccountable, has 
encouraged unprecedented corruption and indiscretion among local personnel, and has promoted 
favouritism and exclusion at the community level. The continued absence of elected leadership in local 
areas has endangered community governance in all its aspects.  
Capacity and resource constraints  
In the study area, many communities face difficulties in accessing education, healthcare, safe drinking 
water and other essential services. To address this, service organisations attempt to enhance the 
managerial and organisational capacities of local institutions. This study found that CBOs could not 
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maintain their integrity and efficiency in service delivery. For example, the annual volume of 
governmental grants for local development has been increasing, but capacity constraints and the power 
games of political parties have prevented local bodies from meeting community needs and efficiently 
managing resources. Nor are the communities themselves always able to identify their problems, 
absorb, manage and utilise their budgets, and achieve positive results. For example, there is ample 
evidence that the annual budget in most local government units is regularly frozen due to lack of CBO 
capacity to use funds properly or in a timely way.  
The skills of CBOs in facilitating, interacting or communicating with their community and other actors 
have also been very weak. Several implications for the community are noticeable. First, there is 
increasing inequality in sharing benefits, which occurs because setting up CBO groups tends to take a 
very long time – years in some cases. In some cases, founder members receive more opportunities, 
leaving little for new members. Secondly, Nepal’s Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) 1999 mandates 
33% women and 10% dalit and ethnic minority participation in decision-making. The annual budgets 
of local bodies and sectoral line agencies also provide for a 10% resource allocation each specifically 
for women and ethnic groups. However, these groups have struggled to claim their shares, owing to 
capacity limitation and lack of understanding of how to draw up and submit proposals. These resources 
tend to end up in the pockets of the elites. Thirdly, resources to implement rural infrastructure projects 
remain underutilised, due to lack of vision or confidence of the leadership. The outcome has been the 
capture of both the decision-making process and project management by local elites, ostensibly on 
behalf of local communities. Fourthly, most CBO leadership positions have been occupied by 
schoolteachers, ex-local government personnel, unemployed educated youth and rich landowners, who 
have not hesitated to grab the benefits meant for the poor or those who do not realise what they are 
entitled to. Among the CBOs studied, most also faced a scarcity of resources, which made them more 
dependent on either government organisations or non-state agencies, particularly donors and NGOs. 
These organisations and their officials generally take a paternalistic attitude, which disparages 
democracy and participation to a great extent. This study found evidence of their rejection of 
participatory decision-making and imposition of their preferences in service delivery management.   
Community service delivery has typically been undertaken either by central governments, community 
organisations or private enterprises. However, this is insufficient, ineffective, and sporadic, because of 
the top-down approach of the central government and private sector organisations. However, multi-actor 
collaborations have to some extent offset CBOs’ lack of incentives, inadequate funds, and absence of 
technical expertise, and partnerships between resource agencies and CBOs have in many cases brought 
about positive change and helped resolve many uncertainties.  
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Conclusions 
Community governance in Nepal has not only been involved in maintaining democratic practice and 
public access to the service delivery system, but also in empowering communities to ensure sustainable 
service delivery. Although many groups at the community level have been engaged in multi-layered 
matters, the trend shows that many micro and macro level factors are facilitating their passage from 
specific to polycentric issues. This study found some negative intercorrelations between the six 
variables indicating structural problems faced by CBOs; these variables were upward accountability, 
inordinate dependency on others (notably local elites, government and donor agencies), institutional 
crisis, socio-economic hierarchical rigidity in communities, resource misuse, and service delivery 
manipulation. These problems were found to hamper the effectiveness of community governance in 
many ways although there have been many efforts to allay them. In many instances, a lack of awareness 
and inadequate orientation discourage communities from participating in community affairs. 
Development partners often act unfairly where community matters are concerned and policy 
formulation and refinement is overly technocratic, mechanistic and formalised. Moreover, CBOs often 
have limited capability and political motivations often mean that leaders prioritise individual interests 
or hidden agendas over wider community needs.  
As long ago as 1990, the Nepalese government transformed local government institutions into 
development coordination mechanisms at the intermediate and grassroots level. However, the evidence 
from the present study indicates that CBOs are directly influenced by many external factors such as 
institutional policies, socio-economic structures, power politics and interests, and capacity and resource 
constraints that dent social capital building. These pressures complicate their decision-making and have 
the potential to make them less capable and more disorganised – with a knock-on negative effect for 
service delivery.   
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